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Abstract. Is there a field of social intelligence? Many various disciplines ap-
proach the subject and it may only seem natural to suppose that different fields 
of study aim at explaining different phenomena; in other words, there is no spe-
cial field of study of social intelligence. In this paper, I argue for an opposite 
claim. Namely, there is a way to integrate research on social intelligence, as 
long as one accepts the mechanistic account to explanation. Mechanistic inte-
gration of different explanations, however, comes at a cost: mechanism requires 
explanatory models to be fairly complete and realistic, and this does not seem to 
be the case for many models concerning social intelligence, especially models 
of economical behavior. Such models need either be made more realistic, or 
they would not count as contributing to the same field. I stress that the focus on 
integration does not lead to ruthless reductionism; on the contrary, mechanistic 
explanations are best understood as explanatorily pluralistic. 
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1 From disunity of science to unified models 
Social sciences, and in particular, research on social intelligence, is today highly 
fragmented and different disciplines are sometimes highly disconnected from each 
other. Although some theorists of social sciences find this situation commendable, I 
do not. For one, there is a danger of duplicating effort in different sciences. For an-
other, high-level abstract explanations in social sciences, when not properly con-
strained, or deepened [1], remain superficial and explanatorily weak. In particular, 
they run a danger of positing entities that play no causal role, if descriptions are not at 
all constrained by lower-level evidence. 
To this, one may reply that such deepening is desired in physical or biological sci-
ences, as these are mostly observable, while social sciences are “constructed.”1 I disa-
gree. All sciences, and in particular, cognitive sciences, are highly theoretical [2], 
positing multiple non-observable entities for explanatory purposes. Mere observation 
is rarely ever explanatory. Similar point applies to “social construction”: even if one 
agrees that some social sciences are busy with normative questions, their job is not 
                                                          
1 I owe this observation to one of the reviewers of this paper. 
merely do describe the social norms but also to explain why there are social norms to 
at all, why they are considered binding by members of social institutions, and so on. 
Prescriptions, or normative guidance – such as the one offered by normative views on 
human rationality – are not explanatory in themselves, at least not obviously so. 
Moreover, contemporary cognitive sciences are very sensitive to social aspects of 
cognition, and that fact makes them relevant for any student of social intelligence, 
radically constructivist or not. 
Even if the traditional question of unity of science seems to be answered today 
mostly in the negative [3, 4], there is a related important question: What unifies a field 
of research? Why various studies are considered contributions to the same topic? An 
obvious answer, namely that it deals with the same entity or set of entities, seems to 
open a can of worms, especially in the light of various criticisms of the traditional 
unity of science. For example, one could say that one unifies cognitive sciences is the 
notion of cognition. Similarly, the field of social intelligence could be said to be uni-
fied because it deals, well, with social intelligence, not surprisingly. 
However, John Dupré [4] has argued that such inter-theoretic identifications of en-
tities are not straightforward. As he stresses, different biological disciplines idealize 
their entities in various ways. A lynx for ecological biology is an extremely idealized 
entity, especially when it comes to mathematical predator-prey models such as the 
Lotka and Volterra equation (for an analysis of the model, see [5]). There is no role 
for genes, for example, in this equation, so as far as this model is concerned, lynx 
might have no genes. It just has to play the predator role. But for molecular biology, 
predation might have no importance at all, whereas genetic structure is crucial. And 
so on. Hence, different fields of study may focus simply on a different entity when 
they talk of social intelligence. 
However, Dupré’s conclusion that the lynx under study is a different entity in dif-
ferent fields is too quick. Even if particular models consider only some of properties 
of an entity, the very applicability of the Lotka-Volterra model to a lynx presupposes 
a larger body of knowledge about the animal. For example, we have to know that it’s 
a species of wild cats, so it will be predatory. This knowledge is necessary for the 
application of the predator-prey models but not contained therein. In other words, 
Dupré’s argument fails, even if he is right that we may idealize lynx differently for 
different explanatory answers. Still, those different idealizations may be so disparate 
that they do not constitute a consistent field of research. Physics and theology can 
study the same entity, such as an ancient scripture; but they do not constitute the same 
field of research. In other words, there is little reason to think that the mention of the 
same entity, even if it is the same natural kind, makes different disciplines unified. 
A disintegration of interdisciplinary research and a focus on very limited explana-
tory models has been one of the worries of Allen Newell and Herbert Simon, found-
ing father of artificial intelligence and cognitive science. They both saw psychology 
as offering micro-theories, or theories of very limited scope, that did not contribute to 
a common view of the human mind [6]. Newell, as an alternative, proposed to unify 
the research program in cognitive science with a notion of a cognitive architecture [7]. 
In his opinion, a cognitive architecture can be used for creating multiple micro-
theories and offers a unifying perspective on how the mind works. In a more contem-
porary context, researchers from the field of cognitive robotics suggested that unified 
cognitive-robotic architectures could be used to unify research efforts [8].  
However, unified theories of cognition are not ways to unify fields of research. 
They may broaden the scope of theories but need not cross-fertilize the field as such, 
and, as Herbert Simon has stressed already in 1998 [9], they stress the systems as a 
whole instead of mechanisms in the systems that make cognition possible. To theoret-
ically integrate the whole field, there must be stress on such mechanisms. That is the 
lesson we take from this effort for the research on social intelligence. 
In this paper, I develop a mechanistic account of unification and integration of the 
field of social intelligence, close in spirit to Simon’s view. In section 2, I introduce 
the mechanistic framework as related to the question of integration different models 
and theories. Then, in section 3, I tentatively sketch the mechanisms that can be stud-
ied to gain insight into social intelligence. I conclude by stressing that the mechanistic 
perspective supports explanatory pluralism. 
2 Mechanistic unification of research 
According to the received view on the unity of science, the goal of the unification 
is to create a single, universal theory. Hence, in this view, the most important rela-
tionships are inter-theoretical, reduction being the most prominent. However, it is 
neither realistic nor desirable to build a single theory in fields dealing with complex 
phenomena [10–13]: Building multiple independent, usually highly idealized, models 
of phenomena may be much more useful than replacing them prematurely with a sin-
gle theory. The core of the argument is that more robust results can be expected when 
they are produced independently by multiple statistically independent models than 
when they are generated with just one of them, as long as they draw from the same 
evidence base. Moreover, by testing how multiple theories or models match available 
evidence, researchers can compensate their confirmation bias, which makes all people 
prone to making a mistake of premature discarding alternative hypotheses [14]. Addi-
tionally, for special sciences, it is simply neither realistic nor practical to reduce them 
to a fundamental physical theory, such as quantum mechanics. In brief, there are gen-
uine advantages in having multiple theories dealing with the same phenomena to be 
explained. 
This consideration means that integrating the discipline is not to be confused with 
replacing all other theories with a single one, as long as alternative sound theories can 
be found. For our purposes, it means that the account of mechanistic unification and 
integration will not aim at disposing with multiple models or theories. So how should 
such integration proceed? 
Just because social intelligence relies on multiple mechanisms, one could appeal to 
a notion of “vertical integration”: 
 
The natural sciences are already mutually consistent: the laws of chemis-
try are compatible with the laws of physics, even though they are not reduci-
ble to them. Similarly, the theory of natural selection cannot, even in princi-
ple, be expressed solely in terms of the laws of physics and chemistry, yet it 
is compatible with those laws. A conceptually integrated theory is one 
framed so that it is compatible with data and theory from other relevant 
fields. Chemists do not propose theories that violate the elementary physics 
principle of the conservation of energy: Instead, they use the principle to 
make sound inferences about chemical processes. A compatibility principle 
is so taken for granted in the natural sciences that it is rarely articulated, alt-
hough generally applied; the natural sciences are understood to be continuous 
[15]. 
 
Barkow et al. complain that in behavioral and social sciences such is not the case. 
These fields proceed in splendid mutual isolation. But how can one exactly under-
stand this vertical integration, or compatibility of sciences? 
One recent proposal of a general account of inter-theoretic and inter-model rela-
tionship is to use the notion of a constraint [16]. The weakest kind of constraint is a 
truth-constraint: two bodies of knowledge satisfy a truth-constraint just in case they 
can be both true at the same time. The notion of truth-constraint can be then used to 
precisely spell out the notion of vertical integration: namely, two bodies of knowledge 
are vertically integrated iff one body of knowledge truth-constraints the other and the 
first body cannot (in some weak sense) be false. (Notice that this definition accounts 
for vertical integration in a somewhat deflationary manner. The relationship is 
asymmetric in such a case, when normally, truth-constraining is horizontal, i.e., no 
body of knowledge is presupposed to be definitely true or more reliable than the oth-
er). However, truth-constraining is a weak relation of logical coherence. The wave 
theory of light does not exclude the particle theory of light, so they satisfy the (hori-
zontal) truth-constraint, even if they propose a completely different account of the 
basic nature of light. One stronger constraint concerns the nature of entities and pro-
cesses (activities) presupposed by both theories. Both theories of light no longer satis-
fy such a constraint, unless a unifying theory is proposed: one that holds that light has 
both the nature of a particle and wave at the same time. 
The entity and process constraints can be easily applied to a mechanistic account of 
explanation, which is particularly sensitive to issues of interfield research [17, 18]. 
Before I go to elucidate how that applies to the study of social intelligence, the notion 
of mechanistic explanation has to be made clear. According to new mechanism, to 
explain a phenomenon φ is to elucidate the causal structure of the mechanism that 
gives rise to φ. While mechanisms are defined variously, the core idea is that they are 
organized systems, comprising causally relevant component parts and operations (or 
activities) thereof (for a recent review, see, e.g., [19]). Component parts of the mech-
anism interact, and their organized operation contributes to the capacity of the mecha-
nism to exhibit φ. 
Another important notion to be elucidated is the one of the interfield theory. The 
interfield theories are ones that relate at least two fields of study. By a field of study, 
Darden understands for example cytology or genetics rather than biology; in other 
words, it has a more restricted scope than a theory or a discipline. Two fields may 
appeal to the same spatiotemporal locations, entities or activities, and one of them 
may provide a better understanding of the spatiotemporal relationships, causal rela-
tionships, physical nature, structure or function thereof. In the case of social intelli-
gence, it is quite clear that social relationships may be elucidated in various ways by 
various disciplines, from evolutionary and ecological biology [20] to cultural studies. 
There are at least three ways fields may become integrated mechanistically: by 
simple integration, when the models of mechanisms can be considered pieces of puz-
zle that fit together; by interlevel relationship, when another level of organization is 
added to make explanation more complete; and by intertemporal integration [18]. In 
the case of simple integration, two fields may simply study social intelligence in a 
similar way but with a slightly different stress. For example, sociology of science 
studies researchers in a lab, and so does cultural anthropology, while the first field 
may use more quantitative analyses and historical evidence than the other to study 
similar phenomena.  
The interlevel relationship is much more complex, as it may be confused with re-
duction. The need to introduce multiple levels of explanation is related to the nature 
of the mechanism under study. As Herbert Simon [21] argued, on theoretical grounds, 
complex systems are likely to be near-decomposable, or composed of subsystems 
whose interactions are weak but not negligible. One facet of near-decomposability is 
hierarchical organization, in which different levels can be discerned, with interactions 
at a different order of magnitude. Such systems, as long as their capacities to be ex-
plained are identified, can be subject to mechanistic constitutive explanation, in which 
lower levels of organization explain higher levels. Levels are understood spatiotempo-
rally; and the relationship between them is proper part-whole relationship [22] (for a 
longer account, see [13]; for a more deflationary one, [23]). Note that the existence of 
a lower level explanation does not make the higher level disposable in this frame-
work: the higher level is explained by the interaction of the components and activities 
on the lower level, and the lower level contributes to the capacity of the higher level. 
In such a case, one could say that our knowledge of the higher level has been deep-
ened, which also leads more empirical credentials to our previous beliefs about the 
higher level [24]. 
As long as explanations are integrated in an interlevel fashion, they are not only 
truth-constrained. The model of the lower level of a mechanism elucidates the activi-
ties and entities of the mechanism on the higher level. Such mechanistic explanations, 
called constitutive, cover at least three levels of organization: the bottom (-1) level, 
which is the lowest level in the given analysis and describes the internals of mecha-
nism parts and their interactions; an isolated (0) level, at which the parts of the mech-
anism are specified along with their interactions (activities or operations); and the 
contextual (+1) level, at which the function of the mechanism is seen in a broader 
context. Depending on the shared scientific practice, the bottom level in the explana-
tion will vary [25], as well as the upper levels. Note that one can easily introduce a 
further level if needed. Let’s take an explanation that accounts for reproduction of 
bacteria. The reproduction of bacteria in a given environment (contextual level) is 
explained in terms of division (isolated level that ignores the environment), and divi-
sion in terms of cellular mechanisms (the bottom level). The cellular-level mechanism 
can be further explained by its molecular parts, which would introduce a fourth level 
in this explanation. 
The main, though fallible, heuristics in such explanations are localization and de-
composition [26]. For example, social capacities of a human being can be explained 
by a psychological model, the psychological capacities with a neuroscientific model, 
and many neuroscientific explanations proceed from neuroimaging studies (some of 
which are not reliable; see [27, 28]). Note that from the mechanistic point of view, the 
model of, say, economical behavior of people involved in forex exchange, is explana-
tory only if it is complete. This means that the model needs to cite all relevant causal 
factors and clearly identify the explanandum phenomenon. In more concrete terms, it 
will mean that most micro-economical models will fail to be explanatory, as they tend 
to abstract away from crucial individual causal factors, in contrast to social models of 
behavior [29]. Also, many models that try to explain economical behavior only in 
neurophysiological terms fail to cite relevant factors known from psychological stud-
ies; neuroeconomics has lost touch with the rest of neuroscience by failing to integrate 
behavioral studies combined with physiological, pharmacological, or anatomical 
techniques that rely on animal models [30]. 
The intertemporal integration applies to phenomena that can be analyzed, due to 
their hierarchical organization, on multiple temporal scales. For example, the behavior 
of a person interacting with a computer artifact may be explained by citing distal fac-
tors, relevant for explaining the history of computer artifacts that can be used by hu-
man beings. It can also be explained on a shorter time scale, by citing this person’s 
skills and their acquisition. Also, it can be explained in a fine-grained fashion by us-
ing neuropsychological models of human-computer interaction. Different explana-
tions of behavior will require researchers to appeal to mechanisms operating at differ-
ent time scales. 
The new mechanism frames the discovery of explanatorily relevant mechanisms 
for the mechanism under study in terms of looking up, down and around [31]. For 
example, Craver and Darden write: 
 
One can look up to the higher-level mechanism of which it is a component. One 
can look back to the mechanisms that came before it or by which it developed. One 
can look forward to what comes after it. One can look around to see the even wider 
context within which it operates. The adequate explanation of many biological 
phenomena requires describing a temporally extended and multilevel mechanism. 
This is why many fields, working at multiple levels, often must integrate their 
work in the discovery of mechanisms [18]. 
 
Let me summarize this section. By framing explanations of social intelligence in 
mechanistic terms, one can understand current scientific practice but also articulate 
certain norms of explanation, useful for integrating the field of social intelligence. In 
brief, the field will be unified as long as it will study the complex mechanisms under-
lying social intelligence, and use knowledge about mechanisms operating at different 
levels of organization and various time scales to constrain hypotheses about the over-
all structure of the mechanism. 
3 Levels and time scales of the social mind 
In this section, I will tentatively sketch the mechanisms underlying social intelli-
gence and cite relevant disciplines (for another similar proposal, see [32]). Most ab-
stractly, one can understand social intelligence as capacity for skillful social interac-
tion. Such abilities can be described on various levels of abstraction, for example in 
agent-based models [33, 34]. Such models, however, usually only presuppose certain 
psychological capacities of agents, and for the new mechanism, they require integra-
tion with cognitive science. They can, however, describe multi-agent cooperation and 
coordination. Quite obviously, social organization, with all kinds of business, mili-
tary, power, and informal hierarchies, can be analyzed in terms of near-decomposable 
systems, and hence, idealized as mechanisms or components of larger mechanisms. 
But we can also look down to deepen the explanation of social mechanisms, and cog-
nitive science has growing interest in the social. 
Traditional cognitive science was methodologically individualist, and framed intel-
ligent behavior in terms of processing of internal representations of individuals. Em-
bodied and grounded cognition, the extended and scaffolded mind, enactivism and 
distributed cognition all challenge the traditional approach in different ways. Social 
intelligence is accounted for in terms of embodied interactions supported and extend-
ed by actively built cognitive niches. Despite the variety of approaches, they may be 
jointly dubbed “wide cognition”; they offer a new coherent picture of cognition, as 
well make it possible to integrate and unify interdisciplinary research [35]. Below, I 
list how four approaches of wide cognition enable and require interfield integration. 
The claim of the embodied cognition (EC) is that the physical body of an agent is 
constitutively relevant for cognition; in other words, cognitive processing involves 
more than the brain. Core cognition, which essentially involves perception and action, 
depends deeply on the features of the physical body. This, obviously, means that bio-
logical mechanisms of human beings can become easily integrated on lower levels of 
the explanation. These biological mechanisms may include the features of our sensory 
and motor systems relevant for skillful action, including neural mechanisms of em-
bodied joint attention [36]. 
The situated and embedded approach to cognition holds that cognition should be 
cashed out in terms of the interaction of the agent and its immediate surroundings. 
The extra-bodily context constrains and enables cognition. For this reason, situated 
cognition needs to refer to behavioral studies as well as to basic biological and cogni-
tive mechanisms of sociality, which includes such abilities as mindreading [37, 38]. 
Note that the mechanism of the social mind might not need to cite the controversial 
hypothesis of mirror neurons, sometimes assigned too many tasks without credible 
empirical evidence [39, 40]. 
The extended mind is the idea that cognitive processes are not necessarily brain-
bound and can incorporate external resources such a tools, language, and external 
systems in order to enhance or augment cognitive processes. The difference of this 
approach from situated cognition is the emphasis that parts of what were traditionally 
considered the environment should properly be understood as part of the agent’s 
mind. Even if the claim of the extended mind is exaggerated [41], this approach 
stresses the importance of material bases of cognition [42]. Here, cognitive archeolo-
gy [43] as well as the study of human-computer interactions [44] becomes important. 
The enactive approach to cognitive science recognizes a crucial inter-dependency 
between an autonomous agent and the world it inhabits. Cognitive activity is wholly 
defined neither by the agents nor their environment, but it emerges from their interac-
tion. Again, enactive approaches can be easily linked with some biological disciplines 
and fields, one of which is biosemiotics [45]. It is also very sensitive to temporal di-
mensions of human interactions on multiple scales [46]. 
These approaches in cognitive science are immediately relevant for the study of 
social intelligence, and they do not deny the importance of the brain or individual 
mechanisms. But wide cognition does caution against adopting an excessively narrow 
perspective that abstracts emotions away from the broader bodily, social, and cultural 
contexts that play a critical role in their development and functioning. Obviously, one 
factor critically important phenomenon for study of social intelligence is language, 
which is understood in current cognitive science not as mere realization of a formal 
grammar but also as involving multiple levels of cultural interaction and coordination, 
as well as internal mechanisms, also involving bodily interactions [47–49]. I suggest 
that different approaches of wide cognition offer multiple constraints on social theo-
rizing; at least, these are truth-constraints, but ideally, we should strive at identifying 
common mechanisms that enable distributed, embodied and embedded cognitive pro-
cessing. 
At the same time, there are also competing explanations of various phenomena of 
social intelligence. Should one frame linguistic conventions in propositional and 
game-theoretic terms [50]? Or maybe it requires an evolutionary point of view [51]? 
Or a view that mentions institutional contexts [52], and temporal dynamics [53]? Not 
all these views can be true at the same time, and integration is not just a matter of 
conceptual investigation. One could also see these different approaches as competing 
idealizations; however, they cannot be treated easily as supporting multiple-model 
idealization [12] as they don’t offer predictions or explanations for the same set of 
phenomena (if philosophical accounts of convention can offer any predictions for 
empirical phenomena, for that matter). However, one can see a set of common mech-
anisms for solving coordination problems in many of those approaches; sketching 
those is definitely beside the scope of this paper, whose aim is to defend a certain 
programmatic attitude to the study of social intelligence. 
Another challenge remains to specify how to investigate cultural and social phe-
nomena so as to include them all in a unified models of social and cultural cognition. 
For example, so called network goods have value to someone only if other interactive 
parties also have them. It makes no sense to own a fax machine if nobody else owns 
one. This phenomenon can be studied on different time scales, and it is an open ques-
tion how to integrate economical analyses with the psychological research on joint 
action, and the ethnographical studies typical of distributed cognition with computa-
tional modeling in evolutionary game theory, as it is also an example of a co-adaptive 
behavior. 
4 Conclusion 
In this paper, I merely sketched a mechanistic perspective on the integration of the 
field of social intelligence. (A complete case study of examples how mechanistic 
explanations furnish researchers with multiple constraints in their theorizing would 
require much more space.) Instead of suggesting that there is a single, privileged theo-
ry of social intelligence, to which all other theories or models should be reduced, new 
mechanism stresses that understanding complex phenomena requires rich, multilevel 
models operating at multiple time scales. As such, it can help establish common re-
search topics and identify the core submechanisms of social intelligence. 
The interlevel nature of constitutive mechanistic explanations makes new mecha-
nism a natural ally of explanatory pluralism [54, 55]. Instead of suggesting that there 
should be just a bottom-level causal explanation of all levels of organization of a giv-
en complex system, new mechanism insists that explanations at all levels are needed. 
These different explanations need not belong to the same discipline. They may be 
shared among various fields and disciplines. In other words, constitutive mechanistic 
explanations don’t require different disciplines to become completely lumped togeth-
er, as long as they can provide input for a common body of knowledge about a given 
mechanism. 
This leads to a related issue. The assumption that the whole field of social intelli-
gence is to be integrated may turn out premature. In principle, social intelligence may 
remain just a hub of interaction between different fields concerned with social and 
mental phenomena; it wouldn’t constitute a separate field then. However, the same 
principles would apply then: as long as we’re interested in discovery of real mecha-
nisms of social interaction of cognitive agents, there is a need to avoid excessive 
fragmentation of research, which may only need to isolation of subfields and duplica-
tion of effort. 
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